Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction by CHATTERJI, Shurojit & Ghosal, Sayantan
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Economics School of Economics
6-2009
Technology, Unilateral Commitments and
Cumulative Emissions Reduction
Shurojit CHATTERJI
Singapore Management University, shurojitc@smu.edu.sg
Sayantan Ghosal
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/cesifo/ifp009
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research
Part of the Economic Theory Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Economics at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Economics by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge
at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
CHATTERJI, Shurojit and Ghosal, Sayantan. Technology, Unilateral Commitments and Cumulative Emissions Reduction. (2009).
CESifo Economic Studies. 55, (2), 286-305. Research Collection School Of Economics.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1792
Technology, unilateral commitments and
cumulative emissions reduction
Shurojit Chatterji and Sayantan Ghosal
University of Warwick, United Kingdom
March 28, 2008
Abstract
In this paper, we argue that weak property rights over transnational
pollution and the limited threat of retaliatory punishments blunts the ef-
fectiveness of a broad based multilateral agreement to deliver the emission
reductions required to mitigate climate change. Instead we propose a policy
framework that builds on unilateral commitments, endogenous innovation
and technology transfer that delivers the emission cuts required to mitigate
the threat of runaway climate change in the medium-term (i.e. by 2050)
via a process of cumulative emissions reduction.
JEL classi…cation numbers: Q54, F53, Q50.
Keywords: climate, global, negotiations, unilateralism, technology, cu-
mulative, emissions, reduction.
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1. Introduction
As documented by the IPCC report published in 2007, there is a scienti…c consen-
sus that there is overwhelming evidence of both global warming and the contribu-
tion of human activities to climate change (IPCC, 2007a). To mitigate the possi-
bility of potentially catastrophic climate change, the rise in global temperatures
needs to be stabilized at about 2±C and at about 3±C (relative to pre-industrial
levels) thereafter which, in turn, requires global action to steer the world onto a
sustainable emissions pathway requiring a cut in global greenhouse emissions of
approximately 50% (relative to 1990 levels) by 2050 (Human Development Report,
2008).
The Bali conference in December 2007 was the …rst step in a new round
of global negotiations to determine a post-Kyoto framework to address the threat
of disruptive climate change. The research proposed here aims to use analytical
insights from game theory to make a contribution to the current policy debate
about key features of a global agreement to deliver the emissions cuts required to
mitigate climate change1.
We begin our analysis by identifying the reasons why a broad based multilateral
climate change negotiation procedure will fail to deliver the emissions reductions
required to mitigate climate change. We argue that the reason for this is that a
deviating nation or a deviating coalition can capture the bene…ts from continuing
with high carbon economic activities but pass a signi…cant portion of the costs to
others. Instead we propose a policy framework that builds on unilateral commit-
ments, endogenous innovation and technology transfer that delivers the emission
cuts required to mitigate the threat of runaway climate change in the medium-
term (i.e. by 2050) via a process of cumulative emissions reduction. Speci…cally,
we argue that an initially limited, unilateral commitment to cut emissions by a
small group of nations will stimulate innovative activity in technologies that lower
the relative cost of low carbon activities. Such innovation together with a global
funding mechanism to subsidize technology transfer will alter the participation
constraints of nations over time and result in a cumulative process of emissions
reductions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a review of existing
1In this paper, we focus primarily on the issue of mitigating climate change. This is not
under estimate the importance of global responses to adaptation as much as question of focus.
However, where relevant, the design of policy frameworks to address issues of adaptation will
be discussed.
global negotiations frameworks. Section 3 presents an analysis of the underlying
problems preventing successful global climate change negotiations. Section 4 out-
lines a proposal for a global climate change agreement with cumulative agreement.
Section 5 veri…es key elements of our policy proposal in a formal model. The last
section concludes.
2. Existing global negotiation frameworks
Nothing like a history, however brief, of climate change negotiations (see Speth
and Haas (2006) for such a study) is attempted here. Instead, the focus is on
those features of past and existing climate change negotiations that are relevant
for the research proposed here.
The Earth Summit at Rio in 1992 brought into force the United Nations
Framework on Climate Change, which in turn in 1997, lead to the Kyoto protocol
(UNFCCC. 1997), the …rst global agreement on cutting greenhouse gas emissions.
The protocol itself came into force in 2005 after over 50% of its original signatories
rati…ed it.
A key element in the Kyoto protocol is the theme of common but di¤erentiated
responsibilities whereby highly industrialized countries (the so called Annex 1
countries) undertake commitments to cut emissions to a baseline level (currently
set as greenhouse gas emission levels for 1990 for highly industrialized countries)
but no such responsibility rests on middle/low income countries. However, given
that the US never rati…ed the treaty and formally withdrew in 2001, it is evident
that not all highly industrialized countries …nd it in their unilateral interests to
participate in the Kyoto protocol. Even countries who have signed up to the
Kyoto protocol such as Canada may not meet their obligations under the treaty.
In other words, the Kyoto protocol has adequately addressed the incentives of
countries to either participate or comply.
Moreover, there is no agreed and e¤ective mechanism for high growth devel-
oping countries to commit to emission targets (initially reductions in emissions
intensity followed by emission cuts) or alter their development paths by commit-
ments to adopt low carbon technology. Nor is there an agreed mechanism to
extend the agreement to new periods. Finally, there is no mechanism to address
issues of adaptation to existing climate change or bring about a step change in
innovation that lower the relative cost of low carbon activities.
As matter stand, the Kyoto protocol covers less than half of global emissions.
The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) (which began operating in 2005 within the
European Union) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), have emerged
as the two main enforcement mechanisms for the Kyoto protocol. Some critics
(Anderson et. al. (2007)) have pointed out that the current price of carbon under
the ETS is too low and the range of activities included in the ETS too narrow
(the ETS covers only 8% of global emissions) for it to have a signi…cant impact on
global warming. Moreover, under the ETS, a nation sets its own emission limit
unilaterally each year which leads to uncertainty over future carbon prices and
limits innovation in, and adoption of, low carbon activities.
The CDM is the key mechanism under the Kyoto protocol by which low
carbon technologies are transferred to developing countries: …rms/organizations in
industrialised countries buy carbon credits from …rms/organizations in developing
countries so that the latter are able to switch to low carbon technologies and thus
achieve emission cuts that otherwise wouldn’t have taken place. A key criticism
of the CDM is that the requirement of “additionality” in the projects funded via
CDM is hard to verify in practice. For example, …rms may delay adoption to cost
e¤ective low carbon technologies to bene…t from CDM or use to CDM to adopt
technologies that they would have funded from capital markets or internal funds
in any case. Moreover, a substantial portion of existing targets for emission cuts
in Annex 1 countries participating in the Kyoto protocol will be met by carbon
credits purchased by …rms located in these countries under the CDM. In this
sense, the CDM reallocates the emissions cuts obligations of participating Annex
1 countries but doesn’t generate substantial additional emission cuts (Ellis et. al.
(2004), Michaelowa (2008)).
What were the achievements of the December 2007 Bali conference? First, all
major emitters of greenhouse gas emissions (GGE) have committed to negotiate
a road map to determine a post-Kyoto climate change framework by the Coppen-
hagen Summit 2009. Second, a new funding mechanism, the Reduction of Emis-
sions from Deforestation and Degraded lands in Developing Countries (REDD)
was agreed to prevent deforestation that accounts for 20% of all GGE. Finally, it
was agreed that there would be a Adaptation Fund (valued at $37 million rising
up to $1-5 billion by 2030). However, by building REDD into the CDM, it isn’t
clear how much additional emission cuts will be generated; nor is it clear whether
the adaptation fund would su¢cient to meet the estimated costs which could rise
to $50 billion a year (Sethi (2008)); how issues of participation (and compliance)
by major emitters in the industrialised and developing world will be resolved;
how innovation in low carbon technologies or the shortcomings of CDM will be
addressed.
3. Nature of the problem
As the brief overview of existing climate change negotiations indicates, the key
issues that any global negotiations on climate change have to address are those
of participation and compliance. In order to understand issues of participation
and compliance, it is useful, as a …rst step, to take technological possibilities
as given and ask whether a negotiations procedure geared towards a broad based
multilateral agreement where both participation and compliance is voluntary likely
to succeed.
On the face, by the global nature of the externality involved (greenhouse gas
emissions, GGE hereafter), a broad based multilateral coalition is the appropriate
forum to internalize the externality involved.
However, there may be good reasons why an agreement negotiated by such a
coalition is unlikely to be stable i.e. immune to unilateral and coalitional devi-
ations. Is it in the interest of a nation or coalition of nations to abide by such
an agreement? A speci…c feature of GGE is that externality involved is negative
(damages to future generations). At the same time cutting GGE is costly in the
short-run. Therefore, the answer to this question is related to the non-emptiness
of the core with negative externalities.
For an agreement to be in the core, it must be the case that no coalition
of agents (nations in this case) has an incentive to deviate from the agreement.
There are two diametrically opposite classical results on the core with negative
externalities. The …rst, by Shapley and Shubik (1969), shows that with negative
externalities the core may be empty. In contrast, Foley (1970) showed that the
core is always non empty.
A key assumption in Shapely-Shubik and Foley is that agents outside the
deviating coalition do not react at all to a deviation. The more recent literature
on coalition formation and the core in economies with externalities make di¤ering
assumptions about how agents outside deviating coalition react to a deviation
(see, for example, Hart and Kurz (1983), Bloch (1996), Ray and Vohra (1997)).
Barret (1993), (2004) and Carraro and Moriconi (1998) have shown that a broad
multilateral environmental agreement is unlikely to be stable across a wide variety
of models. In contrast, Chander (2007) (building on Chander and Tulkens (1997))
has developed a notion of the core in a model with environmental externalities
which is non-empty.
What accounts for the di¤erences in these results?
Intuitively, if a deviating agent or a deviating coalition can capture the bene…ts
from continuing with high carbon economic activities but pass a signi…cant portion
of the costs to others (other countries, future generations), any agreement reached
by a broad based multilateral coalition is unlikely to be stable. On the contrary,
if a deviating nation or coalition has to bear a signi…cant portion of both the
global costs while capturing the bene…ts of persisting with high carbon activities,
an agreement reached by a global coalition is likely to be self-enforcing. Which
of the two above scenarios prevails depends on (a) how property rights over the
global externality is de…ned and (b) whether the threat of punishing deviating
coalitions are credible. To put it another way, with weak property rights over the
global externality, when the threat of retaliatory punishments are not credible, a
broad based agreement involving credible commitments to concrete action steps
is unlikely to emerge. We elaborate on these two points below.
The importance of the way in which property rights over externalities af-
fects the incentives of coalitional deviations was originally pointed out by Starret
(1973). In this paper, Starret compared two diametrically opposite results on the
core in economies with negative externalities by Shapley and Shubik (1969) (who
show that the core may be empty), Foley (1970) (who obtained an existence result
for the core by showing that Lindahl equilibria were alwys in the core) and Coase
(1960). He attributed this di¤erence to the way in which property rights over
externalities are de…ned in the two papers: in Foley’s paper and Coase’s original
paper, the objects of exchange are personalized commodities a la Lindahl2 (ensur-
ing that there is an independent market for each externality) so that a deviating
coalition necessarily has to absorb both the bene…ts and costs it generates. In
contrast, in Shapley-Shubik a deviating coalition can pass a signi…cant portion
of costs to others not in the coalition while capturing most of the bene…ts of
deviation.
In addition to key role of property rights over externatlities, another impor-
tant factor in the argument is the limited impact of the threat of retaliatory
punishments. If a country is willing to unilaterally participate in a broad based
multilateral climate change agreement, it is unlikely to punish a deviating nation
itself. From the perspective of assessing the stability of a broad based multilat-
eral agreement, what matters is whether the signatories are willing to carry out
the terms of the agreement but also whether it is in their self-interest to punish
free-riding.
In short, with weak property rights over the global externality, when punish-
ments are not credible, broad based multilateral cooperation is unlikely to emerge
2Lindahl (1919), (1928).
unless it is in the unilateral self-interest of nations to participate and ensure com-
pliance.
A more general (and equally depressing) conclusion can be drawn from the
preceding argument. Given that full cooperation is not stable, is it nevertheless
possible that a smaller coalition of countries can put in place a self-enforcing
agreement to cooperate on emission cuts? The answer to this question depends
again on the incentives of individual countries in the coalition or of subcoalitions
of countries to deviate: if an individual country or a subcoalition of countries has
an unilateral incentive to deviate, even cooperation within a smaller coalition of
countries may also break down.
Working through the logic of weak property rights over the externality and
renegotiation-proof constrained punishments, leads us to the conclusion that self-
enforcing cooperation over global climate change is likely to be limited to a small
of coalition of countries who have an unilateral incentive to cut emissions. Even
within those countries, the spread of a climate change agreement is likely to limited
to a few economic activities. Both participation and spread will be determined
by the perceived costs of switching to low carbon economic activities.
The preceding argument points to the crucial role of domestic politics in deter-
mining the incentives of sovereign nations to unilaterally participate and comply
with a multilateral climate changeagreement. To the extent to which domestic
political outcomes re‡ect median voter preferences, the negotiation options and
strategy adopted by a country will be determined largely by the preferences of
the median voter as well. Standard economic theory suggests that the informa-
tion and beliefs (about the impact of human activities on climate change and the
impact of climate change on the well-being of future generations, current and an-
ticipated price signals about the relative cost of low carbon activities) will impact
on median voter preferences. Behavioral economics points out the importance
of reference points and adaptation in determining the preferences of the median
voter. A di¤erent (and if somewhat contradictory) but equally powerful in‡uence
on global negotiation options is the impact of vocal domestic advocacy groups and
powerful economic lobbies.
Although a broad based multilateral climate change agreement is unlikely to
be stable, there has been a plethora of local/regional/national initiatives (cities,
events, institutions, individuals) to mitigate climate change3. Such local unilat-
eral initiatives to mitigate climate change are more likely to emerge especially in
3Two websites, www.rsacarbonlimited.org and www.cred-uk.org, list several examples of this
phenomenon in the UK.
federal political systems with e¤ective local powers. The issue here is whether
local/national initiatives to mitigate climate change can have a global impact.
In an in‡uential contribution, Pacala and Socolow (2004)4 have shown that
implementing seven wedges will place the world, approximately, on a path to
stabilizing the climate at a concentration less than double the pre-industrial con-
centration. If a highly industrialized nation (or a locality or city within it) im-
plements some of these wedges within its borders, other nations can learn from
its experience and use the innovations (both at the level of policy or technology)
stimulated by such an attempt. For example, if a city introduces a raft of mea-
sures (such as congestion charging, more and better quality public transport) to
induce more use of public transport and some of these measures are successful,
other cities elsewhere in the world can learn from its experience and implement
similar measures. At a national level, reducing the cost of generating electricity
by wind/solar power potentially bene…ts many countries and not just the country
within whose borders the innovation takes place. The point is that there are sig-
ni…cant positive transnational externalities involved in any unilateral initiative.
The question is how should policy respond to alter the participation constraints
of other agents (individuals/…rms/nations) over time (a simillar point in a very
di¤erent context is noted by Dutta, Ghosal and Ray (2005)) so that the emission
cuts required to mitigate the threat of runaway climate change actually take place
in the medium-term (i.e. by 2050) via a process of cumulative emissions reduction.
Such unilateral commitments induce innovation in technologies that lower the
cost of switching to low carbon economic activities by creating a market for such
innovation. Together with a global funding mechanism to subsidize technology
transfer, because of the global externalities involved, over time the particiaption
constraints of other nations will alter and could thus lead to a process of cumulative
emissions reduction. How should the sequencing, coverage and design of these
local/national/regional climate change agreements be structured to minimize the
delay in the global transition to a low carbon economy? This is the heart of the
policy proposal being developed here and is discussed in more detail in Section 4
below.
Recent suggestions in the policy debate (see Stiglitz (2006) and Walsh and
4As de…ned by Pacala and Socolow, a wedge is 1 GtC/y of emissions savings in 2054, achieved
by a single strategy that will not occur without deliberate attention to global carbon. The seven
wedges relate to energy e¢ciency, avoiding investments in durable capital facilities, like power
plants and apartment buildings, that are carbon-challenged, carbon capture and storage, nuclear
energy, and renewable energy.
Whalley (2008) for example) suggest issue linkage namely bundling trade and cli-
mate change negotiations together, using the threat of trade restrictions to ensure
participation and compliance. However, as participation and compliance in a mul-
tilateral agreement bundling both trade and emissions reduction will be voluntary,
the stability of such an agreement will depend on whether it is in the self-interest
of nations to punish deviations. Will a broad based multilateral agreement that
underpins climate change negotiations with the threat of trade restrictions deliver
the necessary incentives to ensure countries commit to speci…c emissions targets?
One reason could be that the ‡ow of immediate bene…ts associated with emis-
sion cuts could alter incentives for countries to participate and thus minimize the
delay in the global transition to a low carbon economy and make such a global
climate change agreement more likely to be self-enforcing. Another reason could
be that there are positive externalities associated with trade liberalization that
can be used to counter balance the weak property rights over emissions. However,
as participation and compliance in a multilateral agreement bundling both trade
and emmissions reduction will be voluntary, the stability of such an agreement
will depend on whether it is in the self-interest of nations to punish deviations.
4. Elements of an alternative policy proposal
In what follows we propose an alternative policy proposal hat builds on unilateral
commitments, endogenous innovation and technology transfer so that the emission
cuts required to mitigate the threat of runaway climate change actually take place
in the medium term (by 2050) via a process of cumulative emissions reductions.
Our proposal takes as its starting point a credible commitment by a small
group of countries to act unilaterally in the face of global climate change. The
question, then, becomes how does a global climate change agreement have to
be structured around these countries to maximize the spread and depth of low
emission activities? We argue that a global climate change agreement has to be
structured so that the cost of switching to low carbon activities falls fastest over
time so that starting from a situation with limited coverage, low carbon activities
spread cumulatively over time across countries and economic sectors.
Such a policy proposal would have at least three key elements:
(a) unilateral commitments by a small group of countries (which may include
major polluters including developing countries by the use of ‡exible negotiation
instruments) to speci…c emissions targets and the use of appropriate pricing mech-
anisms to establish a time table for country-speci…c and sector-speci…c quantity
targets and technology standards and a stable, rising global carbon price;
(b) global policy frameworks, with di¤erentiated responsibilities across coun-
tries, that coordinate and build on such unilateral commitments to stimulate
innovation that lowers the relative cost of low carbon activities, fully accounting
for the positive externalities generated by such innovation;
(c) a global funding mechanism (adequately designed to address issues of in-
centives and additionality in the CDM and perhaps separating out issues of adap-
tation and mitigation) to subsidize technology transfers and commercialise low
carbon technologies so that the participation constraints of nations alter over
time and the emissions cuts required to mitigate climate change actually take
place in the medium-term (i.e. by 2050) via a process of cumulative emissions
reduction.
We elaborate our policy proposal below:
1. As a …rst step, a policy regime that builds on a limited unilateral commit-
ment by a small group of countries to act in the face of global climate change.
Two issues are key to this process.
A credible timetable for country-speci…c and activity-speci…c quantity targets
for adoption of low carbon activities has to be established which in turn requires
inputs from earth science that determines the how global emission have to be
cut over time to achieve stabilization of temperatures to prevent runaway global
climate change. Equally important is the issue of appropriate quantity targets
for di¤erent countries. For example, to induce participation in a global climate
change agreement, high income countries may commit to emission cuts but at
least initially middle/low income countries may be only willing to commit to
reductions in emission intensities and perhaps adoption of technology standards.
What is important is to get credible time-bound commitments to speci…c emissions
targets in place for di¤erent countries to adopt low carbon activities.
Next, a stable, rising global carbon price has to be established by a system of
emissions trading or carbon taxes. A key argument in favour of emissions trading
is that such a mechanism will deliver emissions cuts e¢ciently with minimal social
cost. Nevertheless, as pointed out in the preceding section, several criticisms of
the emissions trading system can be made. Clearly the design and the industrial
organization of markets with emissions trading is a key issue (see Joskow et.
al. (1998) for a study of the market for sulphur dioxide emissions along similar
lines). How do the speci…c trading institutions a¤ect the strategic behaviour of
agents in carbon markets? What impact does such strategic behaviour have on
carbon prices over time? A related issue is the interplay of strategic trading in
carbon markets with the process by which di¤erent countries set (and annually
revise) emission limits. How do such issues impact on the e¤ectiveness of emissions
trading to price carbon over time so that economic actors have an incentive to shift
to low carbon technologies? Moreover, will emissions trading result in increasing
the relative price of high carbon activities in a general equilibrium (as opposed
to a partial equilibrium) setting? As emissions trading doesn’t result in complete
markets, as the theory of second-best suggests, even from a static viewpoint,
taxes may improve on emissions in realizing e¢ciency gains especially in dynamic
scenarios involving endogenous technological change. An alternative to emissions
trading is carbon taxes (Nordhaus (2007)) with emissions caps. Could carbon
taxes be more successful at establishing a stable rising sequence of carbon prices
than emissions trading?
2. Switching to low carbon activities requires technologies that relate primar-
ily relate to energy, infrastructure, transport and industry (Human Development
Report (2008)). A related set of technologies relate to carbon capture and storage.
Clearly innovation in these technologies in one nation or region will generate pos-
itive transnational externalities. With uncertainty and increasing returns in use,
limited appropriability and signi…cant transnational externalities in the innova-
tion and adoption of low carbon technologies, explicit public intervention will be
required (Arrow (1962)). The design of appropriate public policy, both domesti-
cally and globally, to stimulate such innovation is an integral element in our policy
proposal for structuring global climate change negotiations (a point emphasized
by Arrow (2007), Grimaud and Rouge (2007)). An explicit goal of such policy
would be to ensure that the pace of such innovation in low carbon technologies is
rapid.
If there is uncertainty over commitments to emission targets and carbon prices
‡uctuate over time or are too low or if too many economic activities are excluded
from emissions trading, there may be little or no impact on behaviour of …rms and
households and may discourage innovation (costly investment in the production of
new ideas) that lowers the relative cost of low carbon activities. It follows that it
is really important to get credible time-bound commitments to speci…c emissions
targets in place for di¤erent countries to adopt low carbon activities together
with a rising carbon price over time. Such policies will have the consequence of
establishing a stable market for innovation in technologies that lower the relative
cost of low carbon activities.
3. Next, such innovation together with a global funding mechanism to subsidize
technology transfer will alter the participation constraints of nations over time and
result in a cumulative process of emissions reductions5. What would such a policy
regime look like?
Any global funding mechanism to subsidize technology transfer that alters the
participation constraints of nations over time will have to build on the experi-
ence and the lessons learnt from the operation of the CDM. An alternative to the
CDM could be a global carbon fund which is used to fund technology transfer to
middle/low income countries once they have committed to adopt sector speci…c
low carbon technology standards in energy, infrastructure, transport and industry.
Such conditional access to a global carbon fund might restore the possibility of
successful global climate change negotiations. In addition, an appropriately de-
signed global carbon fund might address issues of restorative justice by separating
the funding of adaptation to existing climate change from the funding of adoption
of low carbon activities. Clearly, such a global carbon fund has to be established
ex-ante (i.e. before any emission cuts or reductions in emission intensity actually
take place) for it to e¤ectively embody a credible yet conditional global commit-
ment to switch to low carbon activities. Assessing the feasibility and design of
such a global carbon fund is a key element in our policy proposal for global climate
change negotiations.
Clearly, such a global carbon fund has to be established ex-ante (i.e. before
any emission cuts or reductions in emission intensity actually take place) for it
to e¤ectively embody a credible yet conditional global commitment to switch to
low carbon activities. The actual deployment of such funds may be achieved
by decentralized market mechanisms that adequately address additionality issues
by institutionalizing appropriate veri…cation procedures. Assessing the feasibility
and design of such a global carbon fund is a key element in our policy proposal
for global climate change negotiations.
In e¤ect, our proposal will change the underlying game that sovereign countries
play in negotiating a global climate change agreement. In the next section, we
verify key elements of our policy proposal in a formal model.
5. A simple model
In this section, we verify key elements of our policy proposal in a formal model. For
simplicity, we study a scenario where adoption low emission activities necessarily
involves emission cuts. In a simple two nation example, we show that with …xed
5Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) obtain a simillar result on increasing participation in an
environmental agreement by the use of transfers.
technological possibilities, the core is empty. Then, we introduce endogenous
technology and verify the possibility of cumulative emissions reduction.
There are three time periods,  = 1 2 3 and 2 nations. At  = 1 2,  2 f0 1g
denotes the emissions of greenhouse gases by nation  so that at any   = 0
corresponds to a emissions cut while  = 1 denotes a situation where nation 
persists with high carbon activities. Let  = 1 + 

2 denote the total emissions
at time . Let  = 1 + 2 denote total emissions across the two time periods.
Emissions cuts with a …xed technology
We assume that at each  = 1 2, there is a bene…t  from high emission
activities. The cost of emissions is borne at  = 3 and each nation  bears a cost
that is proportional to the total emissions across the two time periods .
We assume that
P2
=1  ¡ 2
P
=1  	 0 so that it is e¢cient to set 

 = 0 for
all  .
We assume that property rights over emissions are "weak" so that in an e¢cient
scenario where  = 0 for all  , a unilateral deviation nation  can capture the
bene…ts from choosing  = 1 at any  without bearing the social cost of doing so.
Can a multilateral agreement to cut emissions be stable i.e. immune to in-
dividual and coalitional deviations? The following simple example shows that it
is a robust possibility that no stable agreement exists i.e. agreements that are
immune to unilateral and coalitional deviations.
We begin by constructing a simple but robust example showing an empty
core. Note that the coalition consisting of both nations will always pick a Pareto
e¢cient action pro…le as any other pro…le can be jointly improved upon. To show
that there is an empty core in this example it su¢ces to show that each nation
has a unilateral incentive to deviate from an e¢cient action pro…le at some . In
pure actions, the only e¢cient action pro…le is  = 0 for each  and .
With externalities, to de…ne a payo¤ to nation  from a unilateral deviation,
we need to de…ne what the other nation 
 does following such a deviation. We
consider two scenarios:
Scenario 1. The other nation 
 does nothing i.e. doesn’t change its own action
in response to a unilateral deviation by nation ;
Scenario 2. The other nation 
 chooses a best response to any action chosen
by nation  including a unilateral deviation.
There are two cases to consider:
Case 1: 1 ¡ 1 	 0 but 2 ¡ 2  0: In this case, under both scenarios, the
core is empty. Suppose nation 2 contemplates a unilateral deviation at  = 2 to
22 = 1. In this case, under either scenario, 

1 = 0 for each  and as 2 ¡ 2  0,
nation 2 will always deviate.
Case 2:  ¡   0  = 1 2: In this case, under scenario 1, the core is empty.
Suppose nation  contemplates a unilateral deviation at  = 2 to 2 = 1. As 

 = 0,

 6= , for each  and  ¡   0, nation  will always deviate. Under scenario 2,
however, the core is also empty. To see this note that whether or not a nation
 contemplates a unilateral deviation, at each , 
 will best-respond by choosing
 = 1,  = 1 2. Therefore, by choosing 

 = 0 for each , nation  gets a payo¤ of
¡2 while a deviation to  = 1 in either period yields a payo¤ of ¡ 3  ¡2
as  ¡   0.
As all the inequalities involving payo¤ comparisons are strict, the empty core
result is clearly robust.
So far, in this example, we haven’t allowed for the possibility of transfers
between countries. Is the core with transfers non-empty as well? Clearly, when
 ¡   0  = 1 2, allowing for transfers between nations makes no di¤erence:
the core will be empty in this case as well.
So consider the case when 1 ¡ 1 	 0 but 2 ¡ 2  0. In this case, if
nation makes a transfer  per period to nation 2, conditional on nation 2 cutting
emissions, then for  to induce a cut in emissions, it must be the case that  ¸
2 ¡ 2. However, for it to be in the self-interest of nation 1 to transfer  per
period to nation 2 it must be the case that ¡1 · ¡ or 1 ¸  which implies
that 1 + 2 ¸ 2. On the other hand, if 1 + 2 	 2, no such transfer scheme
exists and gain the core, even allowing for transfers, must be empty.
As the core empty, no multilateral agreement to cut emissions is possible.
If  ¡  	 0, nation  will unilaterally agree to cut emissions in each period.
However, such a unilateral commitment will not result in cumulative participation.
Emissions cuts with endogeneous technology
In addition to choosing  2 f0 1g,  = 1 2, at  = 1 now country  can
choose to invest  2 f0 1g in a technology that lowers the relative cost of cutting
emissions at  = 2 but for which it pays an up-front cost of  () with  (0) = 0
and  (1) =   0. For simplicity we assume that if  is invested in the
technology, the bene…t to country  of cutting emissions at  = 2 is  while
if nation 
 invests  and nation  uses the technology of nation 
, nation 0
bene…t is also .
Assume that 1 ¡ 1 	 0 but 2 ¡ 2  0. Using arguments identical to those
used in Example 1, note that the core, under both scenarios 1 and 2, is again
empty in this case, as nation 2 will never agree to undertake emission cuts at
 = 1. Moreover, even without any technological change, nation 1 will always
cut emissions in either period. The question is whether there is a multilateral
agreement where nation 1 invests in the technology at nation 2 …nds it in its
self-interest to cut emissions at  = 2.
We assume that a multilateral agreement speci…es a price  if a country
accesses the technology developed by country 
. Therefore, for a …xed (  :  2
), the total payo¤ to country  is:

1
 + 
¡
   
2

¢¡  ¡ 1 + 1
where 1 is an indicator function so that 1 = 1 if nation  buys the technology
developed by nation 
 and is zero otherwise and

¡
  
2

¢
=
½
 if 2 = 1
 + 1 if 2 = 0

Note that nation 1 will never pay for the technology developed by nation 2. If
1 = 1 2 = 0, then nation 2’s payo¤ from using 1’s technology to cut emissions is
1¡21 while its payo¤ from not cutting emissions is 2¡2. It follows that nation
2 will access nation 1’s technology i¤ 1 ¡ 21 ¸ 2 ¡ 2 or 21 · 1 ¡ (2 ¡ 2).
If 1 = 0 2 = 1, then nation 2 will cut emissions if and only if 1 ¸ 2 ¡ 2. If
1 = 1 2 = 1, nation 2 will access nation 1’s technology i¤ 2¡ 21 ¸ 2 ¡ 2 or
21 · 2¡ (2 ¡ 2). Note that 21 can be negative.
At  = 1, nation will always cut emissions but nation 2 will not. What will be
the pattern of investment in technology?
Consider, …rst, the best responses of nation 1. Fix 2 = 0. Then, by choosing
1 = 0, it gets a payo¤ ¡21 while by choosing 1 = 1 it gets a payo¤ of ¡1¡1+
21. Therefore, it will choose 1 = 1 i¤ ¡1 ¡ 1 + 21 ¸ ¡21 or 21 ¸ ¡1 + 1.
Next, …x 2 = 1. By choosing 1 = 0, it gets a payo¤ ¡1 i¤ 1 ¸ 2¡2 otherwise
it gets a payo¤ of ¡21. By choosing 1 = 1, it gets a payo¤ ¡1 ¡ 1 + 21.
Therefore, it will choose 1 = 1 if either one of the following two conditions hold:
(i) 1 ¸ 2 ¡ 2 and 21 ¸ 1, or (ii) 1 	 2 ¡ 2 and 21 ¸ ¡1 + 1.
Consider, next the best responses of nation 2. Fix 1 = 0. Then, by choosing
2 = 0, it gets a payo¤ 2 (2 ¡ 2) while by choosing 2 = 1 it gets a payo¤ of
(2 ¡ 2)¡ 2 + 1 if 1 ¸ 2 ¡ 2 or a payo¤ of 2 (2 ¡ 2)¡ 2 if 1 	 2 ¡ 2. It
follows that it will choose 2 = 1 i¤ 1 ¸ 2+2¡2; otherwise it will choose 2 = 0.
Next, …x 1 = 1. Then, by choosing 2 = 0, it gets a payo¤ (2 ¡ 2) + 1 ¡ 21
while by choosing 2 = 1 it gets a payo¤ of (2 ¡ 2)¡ 2+ 2¡ 21. Therefore, it
will choose 2 = 1 i¤ 1 ¸ 2.
To simplify exposition, assume that 1 	 2 ¡ 2. Then, possible equilibrium
scenarios with innovation, technology transfer and cumulative participation are:
(I) if 1 	 2 and ¡1 + 1 · 21 · 1 ¡ (2 ¡ 2), 1 = 1, 2 = 0 and only
nation 1 cuts emissions and invests in technology at  = 1 while at  = 2 there
is technology transfer with a subsidy from nation 1 to nation 2 and both nations
cut emissions at  = 2;
(II) if 1 ¸ 2 and ¡1 + 1 · 21 · 2 ¡ (2 ¡ 2), 1 = 2 = 1, only nation
1 cuts emissions but both nations invest in technology at  = 1 while at  = 2
there is technology transfer from nation 1 to nation 2 (with a possible subsidy)
and both nations cut emissions at  = 2.
Notice that for a type I equilibrium to exist 1 · 1¡ (2 ¡ 2) + 1. It follows
that as 1¡ (2 ¡ 2) 	 0, 1  j1¡ (2 ¡ 2)j and 1  1. Therefore, for type I
equilibrium to exist, the innovation cost of nation 1 has to be low, the innovation
cost of nation 2 has to be high.
Further, as nation 2 has to be subsidized, there is a potential moral hazard
problem as nation 2 may accept the subsidy and not adopt the technology and
cut emissions. Therefore, the subsidy has to be made explicitly conditional on
nation 2 adopting nation 1’s technology and cutting emissions. Similar comments
apply for a type II equilibrium though in this case, no subsidy may be required
and nation 2 may pay nation 1 for a technology transfer.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we argue that weak property rights over transnational pollution
and the limited threat of retaliatory punishments blunts the e¤ectiveness of a
broad based multilateral agreement to deliver the emission reductions required
to mitigate climate change. Instead we propose a policy framework that builds
on unilateral commitments, endogenous innovation and technology transfer that
delivers the emissions cuts required to mitigate the threat of climate change in
the medium term via process of cumulative emissions reductions over time.
The work presented here is preliminary and incomplete in many ways. First,
several aspects of both the policy proposal and the formal model to verify key
elements of the policy proposal need more work. Second, more is required in
outlining a global framework that addresses adaptation to the consequences of
existing climate change. Both these issues will be the focus of our future work in
this area.
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